Saturday, January 17, 2015

Eternal or Eonian? Part Two (The Hebrew Word Olam)

"There is no word either in the O.T. Hebrew or in the N.T. Greek to express the abstract idea of eternity." (Hasting's Dictionary of the New Testament, Vol. 1, p. 542, art. Christ and the Gospels)

"Let me say to Bible students that we must be very careful how we use the word "eternity." We have fallen into great error in our constant usage of that word. There is no word in the whole Book of God corresponding with our "eternal," which as commonly used among us, means absolutely without end." (G. Campbell Morgan, God's Methods With Men, pp. 185-186)

Although the New Testament Scriptures were written in Greek, they were not written by Greeks but by Hebrew men using the Greek language to express their ideas. Such ideas would've been distinctively Jewish, and largely shaped by the writings of their Hebrew scriptures (the "Old Testament"). Tom Holland (Head of Biblical Research at the Wales Evangelical School of Theology) notes that, "While the vocabulary of the NT could be found throughout the Hellenistic world, it did not have the same meaning when it was used in the religious sense within the Jewish community." Holland goes on to say that when a New Testament writer wrote in Greek, it was "Hebrew in its mind-set and essential meaning."[1]This means that the meanings ascribed to words and expressions by the authors of the New Testament scriptures would have been derived largely from the "Old Testament" Hebrew scriptures rather than from secular Greek literature. 

As we'll see, the word translated "eternal" or "everlasting" in the most popular translations of the Greek Scriptures is the Greek adjective aiónios, which is the adjective form of the Greek noun aion. Because the authors of the "New Testament" Scriptures were Jewish and thought as Jews, we must not turn to secular Greek literature in order to understand the correct meaning of these words, but rather to the Hebrew Scriptures and the Greek translation of these Scriptures. Both of these words were used by the authors of the Greek Scriptures and the translators of the LXX as the Greek equivalents of the Hebrew noun olam, and were intended to convey the same basic meaning.

The Hebrew Noun Olam

The Greek words aión (a noun) and aiónios (an adjective) were used by the Jewish authors of the New Testament - as well as by the Jewish translators of the LXX - as the Greek equivalents of the Hebrew noun olam. In The Encyclopedia Dictionary of the Bible (p. 693), the entry on "eternity" is as follows: 

"ETERNITY: The Bible hardly speaks of eternity in the philosophical sense of infinite duration without beginning or end. The Hebrew word olam, which is used alone (Ps. 61:8; etc.) or with various prepositions (Gn. 3:22; etc.) in contexts where it is traditionally translated as "forever," means in itself no more than "for an indefinitely long period." Thus, me olam does not mean "from eternity" but "of old" (Gn. 6:4, etc.). In the N.T. aionis used as the equivalent of olam." 

The noun olam was derived from the verb âlam, which is defined by Strong's Concordance as follows: "To veil from sight, that is, conceal (literally or figuratively)."  

Olam thus came to mean a long and/or indefinite (or "concealed") duration of time, whether past or future. Strong's defines olamas "long duration, antiquity, futurity." Being a relative word like "great" or "small," the unspecified duration to which olam refers could be longer or shorter depending on the subject with which it is connected. There are numerous things that are called "eternal," "everlasting," or "forever" in many translations of Scripture, but which are actually of limited duration (and have no reference to "eternity"). Consider the following examples from the Hebrew Scriptures (ESV translation) in which the word olam appears:  

The hills are said to be "everlasting" (olam) (Gen. 49:26; Deut. 33:15; Hab. 3:6).  

The Feast of Unleavened Bread was to be observed by the Hebrew people as a statute "forever (olam)," which meant throughout their generations (Ex. 12:17; cf. Ex 27:20-21; 28:43; 29:28; 30:21; 31:16-17).  

We are told that the Aaronic priesthood would be an "everlasting (olam) priesthood" (Ex. 40:15; Num 25:13), although it has since been superseded by the priesthood of Melchizedek (Heb. 7:14-18).  

The servitude of bondmen was to be "forever" (olam) (Ex. 21:6; Deut. 15:17; Lev. 25:45-46; cf. Philemon 15), though every fiftieth year all Hebrew slaves were to be freed (Lev. 25:10). 

The right of the Levites to redeem the houses in the cities they possessed was said to be "for all time" (olam) (Lev 25:32). 

Israel's annual observance of the Day of Atonement was to be an "everlasting (olam) statute" (Lev 16:34).  

The Mosaic covenant was said to be an "everlasting" (olam) covenant (1 Chron. 16:17; Isaiah 24:5), and its ceremonial statutes "forever" (olam) (Ex 27:20-21; Lev. 24:3, 8; Num. 10:8; etc.). However, this covenant has since been superseded by the new covenant, which was ratified by Christ (Heb 8:13).  

The blowing of the trumpets by the sons of Aaron was to be a "statute forever (olam)" which meant throughout their generations (Num. 10:8).  

The children of Israel are told to "remember the days of old (olam)," which meant the years of past generations (Deut 32:7; cf. Eccl 1:10; Isaiah 46:9; 51:9; Mal 3:4). 

Joshua said that the twelve stones from the Jordan were to be to the children of Israel a memorial "forever" (olam) (Josh 4:7). 

The times past in which the idolatrous ancestors of the children of Israel lived is said to be "of long ago (olam)" (Josh 24:2).  
Samuel was set apart for service in the temple "forever" (olam) (1 Sam. 1:22), which meant as long as he lived (v. 28).  

The Geshurites, Girzites, and Amalekites are said to have been the inhabitants of the land "from of old (olam)" (1 Sam 27:8). 

God was to dwell in Solomon's temple "forever" (olam) (1 Kings 8:13; 2 Chron. 6:2), although both this temple and the temple built after it were subsequently destroyed. 

Gehazi's leprosy was to cling to him "forever" (olam) (2 Kings 5:27), which meant as long as he lived.[2]  

In Psalm 115:18, David said that he and his fellow Israelites would "bless the LORD from this time forth and forevermore" (‛ad olam). However, we know that the expression translated "forevermore" must mean "as long as we live," for in the preceding verse he wrote that "the dead do not praise the LORD, nor do any who go down into silence" (cf. Psalm 6:4-5; 30:9; 88:10-12).

Solomon speaks of the grave as being man's "eternal (olam) home" (Eccl 12:5; cf. Eccl 9:10; Job 17:13; 30:23), although we find elsewhere in Scripture that the dead are to be redeemed from it (Hos. 13:14; 1 Cor. 15:26).  

Isaiah states that "the palaces will be forsaken, the bustling city will be deserted, the forts and towers will become lairs forever" (olam) - that is, "until the Spirit is poured upon us from on high, and the wilderness becomes a fruitful field, and the fruitful field is deemed a forest" (Isaiah 32:14-15). 

The smoke of Edom’s judgment (circa 400 B.C.) was to rise "forever" (olam) (Isaiah 34:10).

In Isaiah 57:11, God is said to have held his peace "even for a long time (olam)."  

It was prophesied that the "ancient (olam) ruins" of Israel would be rebuilt (Isaiah 58:12; 61:4; cf. Amos 9:11).  

The angel of the LORD is said to have lifted up the children of Israel and carried them "all the days of old (olam)" (Isaiah 63:9; cf. v. 11).  

God said that he was going to bring "an ancient (olam) nation" against Israel (Jer. 5:15). 

We're told that God "placed the sand as the boundary for the sea, a perpetual (olam) barrier that it cannot pass; though the waves toss, they cannot prevail; though they roar, they cannot pass over it" (Jer. 5:22). But the perpetual duration of this sea-boundary is relative to the existence of the sea itself. The sand can only be considered a barrier for the sea as long as both the sand and the sea exist together. But since the present heavens and earth are not "eternal" or "everlasting," neither is the sea (Psalm 102:25-27; Mark 13:31). And in the new earth, we are explicitly told that there will be no more sea (Rev 21:1). 

Because of their unfaithfulness, we are told the land of Israel would become "a horror and a thing to be hissed at forever" (olam) (Jer. 18:16). 

In reference to unfaithful Israel, God states, "I will make you serve your enemies in a land that you do not know, for in my anger a fire is kindled that shall burn forever" (olam)(Jer. 17:4). But later, Jeremiah states that "the fierce anger of the Lord" would be turned back after God had "executed and accomplished the intents of his mind" (Jer. 30:24).  

God said that he would bring upon Israel an "everlasting (olam) reproach and a perpetual shame which shall not be forgotten" (Jer. 23:40), and that he would make Jerusalem an "everlasting (olam) desolation" (Jer. 25:9). However, the judgment upon Israel that is in view lasted only 70 years (Jer. 25:12).  

Jonadab commanded his children not to drink wine "forever" (olam) (Jer. 35:6), which meant as long as they lived (v. 8).  

Because Mount Seir (Edom) is said to have cherished "perpetual (olam) enmity" against the nation of Israel, God promised that he would make it a "perpetual (olam) desolation" (Ez. 35:5, 9).  

Jonah's three-day stay in the belly of the great fish was said to be "forever" (olam) (Jonah 2:6).  

In all of the above verses, the inspired writers used the word olam to refer to things that most Christians would concede were of limited duration rather than things of literally "eternal" or "everlasting" duration. Both promised temporal blessings and threatened temporal punishments are referred to as being olam (of an indefinite, "hidden" duration of time).  

Moreover, it is noteworthy that ina number of these verses, the translators chose words from the English language which literally mean "lasting without end" (i.e., "forever" and "everlasting") to translate olam, even when the word was clearly used in reference to things that were of limited duration. This should alert every reader to the fact that a scriptural word may have a meaning that is not immediately apparent from the English word (or words) with which it has been translated in certain Bibles. This does not necessarily mean that those who translated the above verses into English were knowingly misleading the reader, or that such translations are completely unreliable or worthless. What it does mean is that we should use discernment and critical thinking when reading any translation of Scripture. We must carefully consider and explore the options available to us rather than jumping to conclusions - especially when the subject is as weighty as the one under consideration in this study.



[1] Contours of Pauline Theology, Christian Focus Publications, 2004; p. 252 

[2] On 2 Kings 5:27, Methodist theologian and biblical scholar Adam Clark remarks, "The 'forever' implies as long as any of his [Gehazi's] posterity should remain. This is the import of the word le-olam. It takes in the whole extent or duration of the thing to which it is applied. The 'forever' of Gehazi was till his posterity became extinct."

Eternal or Eonian? Part One (Introduction; A Common Argument Refuted)

Introduction

This seven-part study is, essentially, a defense of the few translations of Scripture we have available in which the words "eternal," "everlasting" and "forever" do not appear (such as Young's Literal Translation, Rotherham's Emphasized Bible, the Concordant Literal Version and the Dabhar Translation). I will be arguing that the Hebrew and Greek words translated "eternal," "everlasting" and "forever" in the more popular versions (such as the NIV, KJV and ESV) do not, in fact, have "eternity" or endless duration in view. Instead, these words have in view long but finite periods of time (i.e., ages, or "eons") during which God's redemptive plan for the universe is unfolding. This "purpose of the eons" (as Paul calls it in Ephesians 3:11, CV) will find its completion in the abolishment of sin and death from the universe and the reconciliation of all to God, through Christ (who, according to the apostle Paul, secured this ultimate outcome by his death for our sins: http://thathappyexpectation.blogspot.com/2014/06/the-ultimate-outcome-of-christs-death.html). This is the ultimate goal or consummation toward which everything is heading, and with which the eons will conclude. It is, in short, a universe in which God is "all in all" (1 Cor. 15:28). As a corollary of this main position I will be defending, I will also be arguing that the blessing which Scripture reveals that believers (but not unbelievers) will enjoy prior to the consummation is not "eternal life" (as is commonly believed) but rather "eonian (or "age-abiding") life" - that is, life during the final eons/ages of redemptive history, prior to the consummation referred to in 1 Cor. 15:28.[1]

In contrast to the above position for which I'll be arguing, the belief of the majority of Christians (as well as that of most non-Christians who are familiar with what mainstream Christianity teaches) is that the Bible teaches that God has suspended the "eternal destiny" of each individual on something that they must do or experience before they die. One common question heard from Christian evangelists (and found in evangelical tracts) is, "Where will you spend eternity?" These alarming words are meant to elicit a repentant decision from those to whom the question is posed. However, the underlying assumption of this rhetorical question is that there is more than one place in which a person might "spend eternity," and that one's eternal destiny ultimately hinges on a decision that one must make (or a conversion experience one must have) before death. According to this commonly-held belief among Christians, the Bible reveals that some people are going to enjoy "eternal life"[2] in heaven, while everyone else will be doomed to suffer "eternal punishment" (or "eternal separation from God") in "hell."

Historically, Christians have been divided as to whether one's eternal destiny is fixed as a result of God's sovereign decree (Calvinism), or as a result of the exercise of one's own "free will" (Arminianism). The belief of most Christians today (and perhaps throughout Christian history) is that it is human beings - and not God - who are the final arbitrators of their eternal destiny. In any case, it is believed by the majority of Christians that Scripture teaches that there are two possible eternal outcomes which a person can experience. Even in verses where the word "eternal" doesn't appear in connection with the fate of unbelievers (such as the well-known John 3:16), their fate is taken for granted as being just as "eternal" as that of the redeemed. 

In spite of its deep roots in Christian orthodoxy and its widespread acceptance by most Christians today, I believe this view of human destiny to be irreconcilable with what Scripture actually teaches. Although it must be acknowledged that no translation of the Bible is perfect and infallible, I believe that a misunderstanding of a few key words employed by the inspired authors of Scripture has resulted in many translations of the Bible which teach something vastly different from (and contradictory to) what God has actually revealed concerning the fate of humanity. While some of these Bible translations may, otherwise, be generally reliable, I believe the destructive consequences of the errors they contain far outweigh any good they could possibly have (at least, for those who are unaware of such errors). The detrimental effect which these translational errors have on people's understanding of the gospel - as well as on their understanding of God's character, plan, wisdom and power - makes the translations that contain them useful tools in the hands of "the god of this eon" (whose agenda involves systematic deception, and the keeping of as many people as possible from believing the truth about what Christ accomplished through his death on the cross).[3]For it is by means of such popular translations that Satan is not only able to keep countless people (both Christian and non-Christian) in unbelief concerning Paul's gospel, but also keep the majority of Christians completely oblivious to the fact that they're in unbelief.[4] 

A Common Argument Refuted 

One of the oldest and most frequently employed arguments used to support the traditional Christian belief that there is ultimately going to be a division of eternal duration between two different categories of human beings (i.e., those who die as believers and those who don't) derives its perceived strength from certain popular translations of Scripture. The verse that is perhaps most commonly appealed to in order to support this position is Matthew 25:46. The argument can be expressed as follows:

1. In Matthew 25:46 (NIV), Jesus speaks of both "eternal life" and "eternal punishment."

2. If the "eternal punishment" of which Christ speaks is not endless in duration, then neither is the "eternal life." 

3. "Eternal life" refers to the final destiny of all believers, and is therefore endless in duration.  

4. Thus, the "eternal punishment" must be understood as endless in duration as well.  

Is this a conclusive argument? Not at all. One could, for example, dispute premise (2) as follows: In Habakkuk 3:6, the same word (olam in Hebrew and aionio sin the LXX[5]) is used to describe both the duration of the mountains and the duration of God's ways. Similarly, in Romans 16:25-26 (English Standard Version), Paul speaks of "the revelation of the mystery that was kept secret for long ages but has now been disclosed." The expression translated "long ages" is "chronos aiónios." If the Greek adjective aionios were translated "eternal" here (as it is elsewhere in this translation), it would read "eternal times." And in v. 26 Paul says that the revelation of this mystery was "according to the command of the eternal God."  

Now, it is evident that, in verse 25, the Greek adjective aionios cannot mean "without beginning," for Paul's use of the expression pro chronon aionion elsewhere (see 2 Tim 1:9 and Titus 1:2) implies that the chronos aiónios had a beginning. Nor can the word mean "without end," for it is clearly connected with a limited period of time (during which a mystery was kept secret but later "revealed"). Paul is evidently referring to the periods of time that elapsed before the advent of Christ, and before the gospel began to be proclaimed in the world. If the Greek adjective aiónios carried the idea of endlessness here, the "mystery" of which Paul speaks would have never been made known to "all nations" (as Paul said it had been). Thus, in Romans 16:25-26 we have the same word (aiónios) applied to both God and to a "mystery" that was kept secret for long (but temporary) periods of time. 

So assuming (for the sake of argument) that the words used in reference to God in Habakkuk 3:6 and Romans 16:26 are describing God's eternality (I will dispute this idea later, however), we would then have the same words being used in the same immediate context denoting both eternality and limited duration. Thus, the belief that the Greek word aiónios must refer to the same exact duration when applied to both "life" and "punishment" in Matthew 25:46 is undermined. For even if the "life" in view is understood to be endless in duration, it doesn't mean the "punishment" necessarily is.  

But let us now consider premise (3). Does the expression often translated "eternal life" in the "New Testament" Scriptures even refer to the final destiny of the saved? Does the Greek word translated "eternal" in most Bibles truly mean "lasting forever" or "without end," in an absolute sense? As we'll see in the remainder of this study, this isn't at all what Jesus and his apostles meant by the expression. 

__________________________________________________________

[1] Generally speaking, we can say that the blessing of eonian life will consist of one's being alive during (and therefore able to enjoy) the final eons that will transpire before God's redemptive plan for the universe reaches its ultimate goal. When we dig a little bit deeper, I believe that what Scripture reveals about the nature of "eonian life" and who will enjoy it is somewhat more nuanced (for example, I believe Scripture reveals that some who will enjoy eonian life will be immortal, while others will be mortal). But as these details are not really relevant to the purpose of this study, a more in-depth investigation of this particular subject will have to wait. 

[2] Christ spoke of the blessing commonly translated "eternal life" as a blessing available to believers only (John 3:14-16; 5:24; 6:40, 47). The apostle Paul did so as well. But this necessarily excludes not only those who have made an "informed decision" to reject the gospel, but also infants/young children, many mentally disabled people, and every person throughout history who has lived and died without having ever heard the gospel. Thus, if the expression commonly translated "eternal life" refers to one's final salvation, and if only those who believe the gospel before they die will be finally saved, then all who die as infants/young children, many mentally disabled people, and every person throughout history who has died without having heard the true gospel will be lost forever (and to attempt to make any category of persons an exception to this requirement is to completely undermine the position that belief in the gospel before death is absolutely necessary to being finally saved). However, as I will be arguing in this study, this is (fortunately) not the case! 

[3] According to Paul in 2 Corinthians 4:3-4, Satan (the "god of this eon") "blinds the apprehensions of the unbelieving, so that the illumination of the gospel of the glory of Christ...does not irradiate them." 

[4] Even so, we must keep in mind that "all is out of God" (Rom. 11:36) and that God is "operating all in accord with the counsel of his will" (Eph. 1:11). And this must necessarily include the deceptive work of Satan, and the fact that the truth of the gospel and the goal of God's redemptive plan for the universe is being hidden from most people (both Christians and non-Christians). It is evidently not God's will that everyone come into a realization of the truth in this lifetime (although they will, eventually; see 1 Tim. 2:3-7). 

[5]In the 3rd century B.C., the Greek king Ptolemy of Egypt commissioned the translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into Greek. This translation (known as the Septuagint, or the LXX)was the first translation of the Hebrew Bible into another language. Significantly, the Greek dialect or form into which the Hebrew Scriptures were translated was Koine Greek. What's significant about this is that Koine Greek is the dialect in which the "New Testament" was written, and was in common use among the Jews in Christ's day. For more information on the LXX, see 

Monday, August 11, 2014

You Shall Be With Me In Paradise

Elsewhere on my blog I've argued that, in contrast with what most Christians believe,  those who have died are actually dead and must be restored by God to a living existence (which occurs when they're resurrected) in order for them to consciously go or be anywhere. For those interested in reading more on this important subject, the following are some articles on my blog in which I've defended my understanding of what Scripture reveals concerning the nature of death and the state of the dead: 

Life after Death (Part 3): http://thathappyexpectation.blogspot.com/2015/06/life-after-death-part-3.html (links to parts 1 and 2 of this series are included)



Now, Christ's words in Luke 23:43 are commonly believed to be inconsistent with the view defended in the above articles. According to what most Christians believe, Christ promised the malefactor to whom he spoke that he would be in "paradise" on the day that he died (or rather, on the day his body died, as most Christians see it). By "paradise," most Christians believe that Jesus was referring to either heaven (where God sits enthroned) or to a mysterious region in the "netherworld" where the "disembodied souls" of the righteous dead were thought to temporarily reside. But is this interpretation required by the original inspired text? 

Here is how Luke 23:39-43 reads in the Concordant Literal New Testament:

Now one of the hanged malefactors blasphemed Him, saying, "Are you not the Christ? Save yourself and us!" Yet answering, the other one, rebuking him, averred, "Yet you are not fearing God, seeing that you are in the same judgment! And we, indeed, justly, for we are getting back the deserts of what we commit, yet this One commits nothing amiss." And he said to Jesus, "Be reminded of me, Lord, whenever Thou mayest be coming in Thy kingdom." And Jesus said to him, "Verily, to you am I saying today, with Me shall you be in paradise."

The original Greek manuscripts had no punctuation, and so commas must be provided by the translators. In the case of this verse, the placement of the comma is just as much a matter of interpretation as it is of grammar, so the fact that most English translations place the comma after "truth" (or "you") instead of "today (or "this day") simply shows the preferred interpretation of the translators, and not how the Greek has to be translated in order to be grammatically correct. The Greek adverb translated "today" or "this day" (sēmeron) may qualify either legô ("I am saying") or esomai ("shall you be").

Because either option is grammatically possible, the question of where the comma should be placed when translating the verse into English must be determined by other considerations. Christ's words, "Truly, I say to you, this day you shall be with me in paradise," may just as legitimately be constructed as, "Truly, I say to you this day, you shall be with me in paradise." By placing the comma after "today" instead of "you," the fulfillment of Christ's promise need not be confined to the day in which they died, but may be understood as having its fulfillment at some time in the distant future. This translation is not only grammatically valid, but it makes Christ's words consistent with what the rest of Scripture teaches (as well as what Christ himself said) concerning the state of the dead.

In addition to the Concordant Version, J.B. Rotherham (in his Emphasized Bible) translates Luke 23:43 as follows: "Verily, I say unto thee this day: With me, shalt thou be in Paradise." It's interesting that Rotherham included a footnote giving the more traditional reading, even though he disagreed with it. Of course, he didn't have as much to lose as the people working on modern translation committees (who likely would not have been on the committees in the first place were it not for their commitment to what is commonly considered "historic evangelical orthodoxy"). While holding to the belief that the dead are actually dead (and thus functionally inactive and unconscious) would not be considered as serious an error as, say, a rejection of the doctrine of hell or of the trinity, this belief is still considered inconsistent with historic evangelical orthodoxy, and would likely disqualify someone from being on the translation committee to begin with.

Objection: "Don't these translations make the word "today" redundant and unnecessary?"

Answer: Not at all. The word "today" (or "this day") was often used by the Hebrew people idiomatically, to introduce a solemn and important statement. According to this Hebrew/Aramaic idiom, "today/this day" often follows a verb of declaration, testification, command or oath, and emphasizes the solemnity and importance of the occasion or moment. Paul, for example, used this idiom in Acts 20:26 when he declared, "Therefore I testify to you this day (semeron) that I am innocent of the blood of all of you" (Acts 20:26). 

This idiom actually occurs about 70 times in Scripture, with 42 instances being found in the Book of Deuteronomy alone (see, for example, Deut. 4:26, 39, 40; 5:1; 6:6; 7:11; 8:1, 11, 19; 9:3; 10:13; 11:2, 8, 13, 26, 27, 28, 32; 13:18; 15:5; 19: 9; 26:3, 16, 18; 27:1, 4, 10; 28:1, 13, 14, 15; 29:12; 30:2, 8, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19; 32:46; cf. Josh 23:14). Moreover, the word semeron appears in the LXX (the Greek Old Testament) and the New Testament 221 times. In 170 of these places, the adverb follows the verb it modifies (some examples of this in the NT are Luke 2:11; 5:26; 22:34; Acts 20:26; 22:3; 24:21; 26:29; 2 Cor. 3:14, 15). There are thus 170 witnesses against 51 in favor of placing the comma after "this day." 

It would, therefore, not only be grammatically legitimate to punctuate Luke 23:43 with the comma after "this day" (so that the adverb follows the verb it modifies), but it would also be consistent with how the word semeron is most frequently used in Scripture. When we take the Hebrew idiom into account it becomes evident that, in response to the malefactor's request, Christ was in effect saying, "I give you my solemn word that you will be with me in paradise." Christ didn't say when they would be in paradise together - only that they would be.

Moreover, the earliest translation of the Greek New Testament was in the language of Israel's nearest neighbor, Syria. Syriac is a dialect of Aramaic, which most scholars believe Jesus spoke at least on occasion, if not regularly (for example, Jesus' words on the cross, "Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani" appear to be the Aramaic form of the words of Psalm 22:1). So it is a reasonable inference that, in his reply to the thief on the cross, Jesus spoke in the idiom that was common to both his own Aramaic language as well as the Hebrew language of the Hebrew Scriptures. It is therefore not surprising that in one of the oldest Syriac manuscripts of the Gospels (the 5th century Curetonian Syriac) the Hebrew/Aramaic idiom was evidently recognized by the translator. In this ancient manuscript the verse is translated so that the adverb "this day" clearly qualifies the verb "say" (and not "will be"): "Amen say I to you today that with me you will be in the garden of Eden."[1]

By introducing the word "that," the translator removed the need for any punctuation to determine the sense of Jesus' words. And while it's true that the Syriac Sinaitic (the only other Syriac translation of the 4 Gospels that is thought to predate the standard Syriac version, the Peshitta) has the more common translation, the Curetonian Syriac (which, like the Syriac Sinaitic, predates all the English versions by hundreds of years) is still a very ancient witness for this interpretation of Luke 23:43.

Objection: "Nowhere else is Christ's frequently-used formula, "Truly I say to you" modified by an adverb of time. Thus, semeron should be understood as most likely being part of the expression that follows the "Truly I say to you" formula."

Answer: This objection loses its force when we take into account the well-known Hebrew/Aramaic idiom that uses "today/this day" to emphasize the significance and solemnity of an occasion. And who can deny the profound importance and solemnity of this occasion? This was one of the last things Jesus said before he died, and was possibly the last thing the man being crucified next to him heard anyone say to him before he died. It would therefore make sense for Jesus to speak in such a way on this highly exceptional and solemn occasion.

Objection: "In the instances where this idiom appears in the LXX we do not find the same verb word used in Jesus' "Truly I say to you" formula (legô)."

Answer: While this is true, this objection is undermined by the fact that the Hebrew idiom exhibits some variation in the verbs used. The only constant in the idiom is that the word "today" modifies a verb of declaration, testification, command, oath (etc.). In the case of Luke 23:43, Jesus simply employed an idiom with which he and the thief would have been very familiar, and in a way that was most consistent with how Jesus normally declared things to people (i.e., using the word "legô").

There is simply no good reason to reject a certain translation based upon the premise that a particular construction must be found in other texts in order for it to be valid grammar. And it is not improbable that Jesus might have, on occasion, modified the introductory formula that he used most often during his earthly ministry. This is, in fact, the case in Luke 4:25. In this verse we read that Jesus modified the expression and said "ep alhtheias de legô humin" ("I say to you in truth"). Here, "ep alhtheias" adverbially modifies "legô humin." As a result, it seems reasonable to conclude that the expression is not to be taken as an inviolable grammatical mantra.

[1] F. C. Burkitt, "The Curetonian Version of the Four Gospels," Vol. I, Cambridge, 1904.

Monday, July 14, 2014

A Critical Look at the Christian Doctrine of "Free Will"

"Free will is the modus operandi of destiny." C.S. Lewis 

It would not be an exaggeration to say that, for most Christians (especially those outside of the "Reformed" branch of Christianity), the doctrine of free will is vitally important to their theological system. Whether they realize it or not, this doctrine is one of the primary pillars upholding their particular religious worldview. Without this doctrinal pillar in place, their entire religious worldview would begin to collapse. Because of its great importance to so many Christians - as well as its bearing on the conflicting doctrines of eternal torment and universal salvation - I believe it behooves us to carefully examine it. 

Before I begin, however, a few words of clarification are in order. Among philosophers, the kind of free will in which most Christians (and many non-Christians) believe is known as "libertarian free will" or "libertarian freedom." This rather redundant-sounding terminology is intended to distinguish the kind of "freedom" in view from notions of freedom that are thought to be compatible with "determinism" (a philosophical position which holds that everything that happens is caused by a prior event or state of affairs, and thus has a sufficient, antecedent cause and an understandable reason for its taking place). 

In contrast to the freedom that is thought to be compatible with determinism (i.e., "compatibilistic freedom"), libertarian freedom is understood to be "indeterminist" in nature, meaning that the outcome of a future choice that is free in a libertarian sense is thought to be a probability rather than a certainty. To most people, the commonly-used expression "free will" basically means what philosophers mean when they speak of "libertarian free will." Thus, I will be using the expressions "free will" and "libertarian free will" interchangeably. 

I will also, on occasion, refer to the theological position held to by Christians who affirm free will as both the "Free Will" position as well as the "Arminian" position. The theological position known as "Arminianism" is named after 16th century Dutch theologian, Jacob Arminius, who, in contrast with the French theologian and Protestant Reformer, John Calvin (a near-contemporary of Arminius), affirmed that human beings have the free will to either believe the gospel or not, and taught that God elected people for eternal salvation on the basis of his foreknowledge of their faith. Because of his (and especially his followers') opposition to the theology of Calvin, any Christian viewpoint which affirms and emphasizes free will is commonly labelled as a form of "Arminianism."[1] 

What is "Free Will?" 

After coming to reject the Reformed theology I'd grown up believing, I began exploring the non-Calvinistic branches of Protestant Christianity, hoping to discover and know the true God, and to quench my thirst for truth. I was thrilled by the idea that such a large number of Christians believed that God really did love everyone, and that Christ had died to save everyone. Having already become convinced that God truly desired that everyone be saved - and that he had sent Christ for this purpose - I decided to make the "Arminian" theological camp my home. At the time, I didn't know of any other option; I had come to believe that if one wasn't a Calvinist or an Arminian, then one was either just uninformed, inconsistent or confused. 

Despite my eagerness to get as far away from Reformed theology as I could, I never quite felt at home in the free will-affirming camp of evangelical Christianity. While I found the emphasis that Arminian theologians tended to put on the universal love and mercy of God refreshing, I often found their interpretations of certain verses and passages (e.g., those which I'd formerly viewed as affirming God's complete sovereignty over all people and their destinies) somewhat strained and contrived. I also found the concept of free will extremely puzzling, and always thought I was missing something whenever I would read free will-affirming Christian theologians attempt to explain and justify their belief in it. 

For instance, in his book Most Moved Mover(2001), the late Clark Pinnock wrote (p. 127), 

What I call 'real freedom' is also called libertarian or contra-causal freedom. It views a free action as one in which a person is free to perform an action or refrain from performing it and is not completely determined in the matter by prior forces - nature, nurture or even God. Libertarian freedom recognizes the power of contrary choice. One acts freely in a situation if, and only if, one could have done otherwise. Free choices are choices that are not causally determined by conditions preceding them. It is the freedom of self-determination, in which the various motives and influences informing the choice are not the sufficient cause of the choice itself. The person makes the choice in a self-determined way. A person has options and there are different factors influencing us in deciding among them but the decision one takes involves making one of the reasons one's own, which is anything but random. 

In this passage we read of "contra-causal freedom" and of "choices that are not causally determined by conditions preceding them." And then Pinnock goes on to say that such a choice is "anything but random." But is this really the case? In response to Pinnock, one could ask, "Why does a person choose one reason over another when 'making one of the reasons one's own'"? According to Pinnock, the answer to this question cannot be because of any given factor or influence. It cannot be because of the circumstances in which the person happens to be at the time they're making their decision. According to the Arminian position, two people could, hypothetically, share the same exact motives and have the same exact influences operating on them when faced with the same exact decision, and yet they could still use their "libertarian freedom" to make two completely different decisions

Is there any rational explanation that could be given for why two different decisions could be reached in this hypothetical situation that does not involve pure randomness? I can't think of one. To say that a person has the "power of contrary choice" means that, given the same exact influences operating on them, and the same exact motives being present, a person could have made a different choice than the one that was actually made. But what, other than a purely random and inexplicable event taking place in a person's mind, could possibly account for a different outcome resulting? 

Consider the conversion of the apostle Paul. All Christians will agree that, as a result of his encounter with the risen Christ on the road to Damascus, Paul became a changed man. Instead of continuing in hard-hearted rebellion against Christ, he became humbly and joyfully submitted to him. But let's say that Paul's decision to submit to Christ was "free" in the sense that Arminian Christians believe our choice to believe the gospel is "free." If that were the case, then it would mean that Paul could have chosen otherwise. That is, in an identical state of affairs and with all things being equal (i.e., with the same exact influences being present and operating on Paul), a different outcome could have resulted

Think of it this way: if God were to "rewind the tape" of Paul's life and allow him to choose again, he could've made a completely different choice, given the same exact circumstances. But how could such a change in outcome be explained and accounted for? If nothing new enters into the equation immediately prior to Paul's decision, then this theoretical change in outcomes would be completely arbitrary and random. The only thing that could account for a different outcome taking place would be a purely random event occurring in Paul's mind. Thus, it follows that, if the choice Paul actually made was "free" in this sense, then it, too, was a completely arbitrary and random event. 

In Why I Am Not A Calvinist(2004), Arminian philosopher Jerry Walls writes (p. 103): 

The common experience of deliberation assumes that our choices are undetermined. When we deliberate, we not only weigh the various factors involved, we also weight them. That is, we decide how important different considerations are in relation to one another. These factors do not have a pre-assigned weight that everyone must accept. Part of deliberation is sifting through these factors and deciding how much they matter to us. All of this assumes that it really is up to us how we will decide.

In response to Walls, one could very well ask, "But why does a person 'weight' one factor more or less than another factor when coming to reach a decision?" When "sifting through the factors," why would a person decide that one factor means more to them than another if they have no "pre-assigned weight"? According to his view, Walls might answer, "Because I chose to weight this factor more than the others." But in response to this, one could then ask, "But why did you choose to weight one factor more than the others?" And I believe the answer to this question exposes what the doctrine of free will really amounts to: things being determined by random, irrational and inexplicable events. For what non-circular answer could Walls give that is consistent with his position except, "I chose to just because." 

It would be circular (or else lead to an infinite regress) to respond with, "I chose to because I chose to." That's no different than saying, "It happened because it happened." According to his position, the real "reason" for his choice would ultimately have to be, "just because." But to say that something happens or occurs "just because" is simply to say that there is no reason for its occurring, and that it has no explanation. It's just a random, irrational and inexplicable event. And that is what a "free" choice (in the libertarian sense) would essentially be: a random, irrational and inexplicable event. 

In his book Making Sense of Your Freedom (1994), philosopher James W. Felt writes (p. 81): 

After the antecedent conditions have all been considered, as well as the temperament and motives of the agent, there is still room for freedom inasmuch as there is no strict necessity that one of the possible outcomes rather than another must emerge. Yet there is an outcome. A choice is made; a decision is reached. The mind in its drive toward intelligibility asks, "What is the ultimate reason why this rather than that outcome has resulted?" (Why did Lee, for instance, decide to go ahead and attack entrenched Union forces at Gettysburg?) If the act is free, then the only possible answer - admittedly still perplexing, yet perfectly adequate - is this: the sole, ultimate reason, given a variety of enabling motives, is the acting person, the agent. There is no possibility of looking farther, but then there is also no need. Given all the requisite circumstances, it is the agent who is explanation for the act and its outcome, in such a way as not to stand in need of further explanation. 

Here Felt asserts that the sole, ultimate reason why one outcome results rather than another is the person making the decision. In view of his answer to the question he poses, let's imagine a teenage girl asking her mother, "Why did you and dad get divorced?" According to Felt, a "perfectly adequate" (yet "still perplexing") answer to this legitimate question would be, "Your dad and I. We are the only explanation, and there is no need for any other." But what exactly does this mean? According to the libertarian free will position, it would mean that their decision to get divorced has no rational explanation. It "just happened," inexplicably. 

When we keep in mind that a choice that is free in the libertarian sense is essentially an inexplicable, random event, we can conclude that what Felt calls the "acting person, the agent" is (at least, at the time a decision is made) akin to a "random number generator," with the only difference being that what's being randomly generated are choices rather than numbers. Thus, when Felt says that "there is no possibility of looking farther" for an explanation, he is correct. If the choices that we make are being randomly generated by us (as the free will position entails), then the only possible explanation for any "free" choice is the "random choice generator" itself - i.e., "the acting person, the agent." 

Does Love and Moral Accountability Require Free Will? 

It is often argued by free will-affirming Christians that without free will human beings couldn't love, and that it is for this reason that God gave us free will. Christian author and theologian Dr. Gregory Boyd sums up this position in the first thesis of his "Warfare Worldview" as follows: 

By definition, love must be freely chosen. We are able to program computers to obey our commands perfectly, but we don’t consider them "loving." They lack the capacity for love because they have no choice but to do what we program them to do. Humans would be in the same category as computers if God merely "programmed" our actions. In order for creatures to be loving, they must have the freedom to do otherwise (to not love).[2] 

By "freely chosen," Dr. Boyd does not merely mean that a person loves because their heart is such that this is what they truly want and desire to do, and is (for this reason) what they choose to do. Rather, the kind of "freedom" that Dr. Boyd has in mind is libertarian freedom - i.e., the "power of contrary choice." That is, Dr. Boyd believes that, whenever something is "freely chosen," it means that a different outcome could have been effected given the same exact circumstances in which the choice was made, and given the same exact influences the person was experiencing at the time. 

In other words, if my decision to propose to my wife was "freely chosen" in the sense of which Dr. Boyd speaks, then I could've chosen not to propose to her. If God were to "rewind the tape" of my life, I could've made a different decision if my decision was "free" in the libertarian sense. But if everything leading up to my choice (i.e., the various influences and factors involved in the circumstances) remained unchanged - if everything else remained the same - then the only possible, non-deterministic explanation for a different outcome being realized is that a truly random event took place in my mind and changed the outcome. So if love truly "requires freedom" (i.e., libertarian freedom), then it would mean that what love actually requires is the occurrence of an inexplicable, random and irrational event. Thus, for Dr. Boyd, our love for one another is actually a result of pure chance. 

In addition to asserting that love requires free will, it is commonly claimed by Christians that free will is the only basis for which people could be held morally accountable by God for their choices and actions. But as we've seen, a choice that is free in the libertarian sense is actually a completely random event - and how such bizarre randomness can possibly be a prerequisite for a person's being held accountable for their actions is just as inexplicable as "free will" itself. 

Ironically, then, it is the Free Will position which, by ultimately reducing our choices to random, irrational and inexplicable events, eliminates any meaningful way of accounting for moral accountability. To quote philosopher J.J.C. Smart, "Indeterminism does not confer freedom on us: I would feel that my freedom was impaired if I thought that a quantum mechanical trigger in my brain might cause me to leap into the garden and eat a slug."

Is the God of Free Will Christianity Loving? 

According to Arminian Christians, the faith by which believers are saved and avoid being "eternally lost" is the result of the exercise of their free will. Thus, they can blame the unbeliever - rather than God - for the lack of faith that (they believe) will ultimately send them to hell if they die in their unbelief. For most Christians, it is mankind's God-given free will that "lets God off the hook," so to speak, from being responsible for people dying in unbelief, and for the supposed eternal consequences of their "free" decision. However, as we've seen, the kind of free will in which most Christians believe is akin to a random number generator. It is a mysterious power by which choices are randomly and inexplicably generated by a person. A choice that is free in the libertarian sense is essentially an irrational event that has no explanation for its taking place. Whether one outcome results rather than another would, if the free will position were true, be a matter of pure chance. But remarkably, it is on just such a chance event that most Christians believe God has suspended the eternal destinies of all of his human and angelic creatures. 

For most Christians, that which will determine where and how people will "spend eternity" is how they exercise their free will during this relatively brief lifetime (with some lifetimes being much briefer than others)! At some point - either sometime before death, or at the point of death - the "window of opportunity" closes, and there is no "second chance" to make the right decision and be saved.[3] And according to those Christians who believe this to be how things really are, whose ultimate decision was it that this would be so? Who is responsible for the existence of such a bizarre and nightmarish state of affairs in which the eternal destinies of billions of created beings is essentially left to chance? Answer: the God who chose to give his creatures free will, of course! Thus, the "loving" and "wise" God in whom most Christians profess to believe would, if he existed, actually be a depraved being who has decided to let chance determine the eternal destinies of his human (and angelic) creations. 

If this seems too hard to believe, simply ask any Christian who believes in free will the following question: "Why did you make the eternally-significant decision to believe the gospel, while so many others don't?" If the free will-believing Christian is being consistent, he or she will not be able to answer in any of the following ways: 

"God gave me the desire to know him, but he has not yet given this desire to everyone."

"God drew me to Christ, and Christ made God known to me, but he has not yet drawn all." 

"God opened my heart so that I could believe the truth, but he hasn't yet opened the hearts of everyone." 

"God granted me repentance so that I could come to a knowledge of the truth, but he has not yet granted this repentance to all." 

"God gave me the faith to believe the truth, but he has not given faith to all." 

What do all of these responses have in common? Answer: They all acknowledge God as the ultimate explanation and reason for why someone is a believer rather than an unbeliever. And this, I believe, is consistent with what Scripture teaches. According to Scripture, God is completely sovereign over all that takes place. We read, for example, that God "declares the end from the beginning" and accomplishes whatever he purposes (Isaiah 46:9-11). Paul sums up the extent of God's sovereignty when he declares that God works "all things according to the counsel of his will" (Eph. 1:11).[4] 

In view of God's sovereignty, it is evident that, apart from his graciously bringing about faith in our hearts, no one would believe. It is ultimately because of God's sovereign will and purpose that anyone becomes a believer or remains an unbeliever in this life. The faith that distinguishes the believer from the unbeliever is not something that the believer originates by his own "free will," and for which he or she can take any credit. According to Christ, no one knows God except those to whom Christ has chosen to reveal him (Mt. 11:25-27), no one knows the "mysteries of the kingdom" or can receive Christ's teaching except those to whom it has been granted (Mt. 13:11), and no one can come to him unless they have been drawn [lit. "dragged"] by the Father (John 6:44). We cannot receive even one thing unless it has been given to us from heaven (John 3:27). God alone is ultimately responsible for whether one receives the truth or not. 

According to Paul, a person becomes a believer rather than an unbeliever because God chose them before the foundation (or "disruption") of the world and predestined them for adoption as sons through Christ Jesus (Eph. 1:4). Those who believe were chosen beforehand as the "firstfruits" to be saved (Rom 8:28-30; 2 Thess. 2:13). It was granted to them by God that they should believe (Phil 1:29), and thus God graciously assigned to them a measure of faith (Rom 12:3). In order for one to come to a knowledge of the truth and escape the snare of the devil, they must be granted repentance by God (2 Tim. 2:25-26; cf. Acts 11:18). Paul understood that it was God's grace - not his own innate goodness or willingness - that was the source of his faith and love (1 Tim 1:13-14). When a person believes and becomes a "new creation in Christ," this is no less the sovereign work of God than the creation of the heavens and the earth. It is all God's doing (2 Cor. 5:17-18). 

Although God certainly works through the instrumentality of human beings in reconciling people to himself, it is God alone who "gives the growth" (1 Cor. 3:5-9). There is nothing that we contribute to our salvation that does not ultimately have its source in God. Apart from God's Spirit at work in one's mind and heart, one would have no interest in spiritual things (1 Cor. 2:14). Our hearts must be opened by God just so that we will pay attention to what is being said when the gospel is proclaimed to us (Acts 16:14), and those who hear and believe the truth do so only because they were appointed by God for this (Acts 13:48). No one becomes a believer or remains an unbeliever apart from the divinely-controlled circumstances that God is using to accomplish his redemptive purpose in the world. 

Now, let's return to the question we posed earlier to the free-will believing Christian: "Why did you make the eternally-significant decision to believe the gospel, while so many others don't?" If they are consistent, they will have to answer something like this: "Because I chose to, and they didn't." In other words, "I chose to because I chose to, and they didn't because they didn't." And if you then ask them, "But why did you choose to, when so many others don't?" they will most likely either shrug their shoulders or say something along the lines of, "I don't know why; I just did, and they just didn't." 

And they would be correct. For if their faith (and someone else's unbelief) was a result of a choice that was free in the libertarian sense, then the choice was a completely random event that simply can't be explained or accounted for. The fact that they chose one way (to believe the gospel), while someone else chose another (to remain in unbelief), would be due to chance alone. And so it is chance which their "loving God" decided would determine who will, and who won't be, eternally saved. 

But it gets worse. Not only has the God of Arminian Christianity left the eternal destiny of all people up to pure chance, he (according to most Arminian Christians) foreknew before the creation of the world who would and who wouldn't choose to believe. In other words, the God of Arminian Christianity - before he ever created anything - knew full well that billions of his creatures (both human and angelic) would fail to exercise their "free will" properly, and yet he callously brought them into existence and allowed them to "freely" damn themselves for all eternity.

Consider the following argument: 

1. The God of Arminian Christianity foreknew before creation how every created person would exercise their free will in response to his grace if he were to create them.

2. The God of Arminian Christianity foreknew that some (most) created persons would fail to meet the requirement(s) of salvation if he were to create them.
 

3. The God of Arminian Christianity created - and will forever sustain in existence - those whom he foreknew would never be saved, and who will spend eternity in hell.
 

4. Any being who would do this is depraved and malevolent.
 

5.
 The true God is not depraved and malevolent, but perfectly good.

6. The "God" of Arminian Christianity is not the true God.
 

But let's be generous and say (as some Arminians do) that God does not have foreknowledge of any choices that are free in the libertarian sense, and thus did not have certain knowledge of who would and who wouldn't be eternally saved. This position within the Arminian camp is known today as "Open Theism." But with this view, we still have a God who has suspended the eternal destinies of his creatures on pure chance by giving them "free will" and making them the arbiters of their eternal destiny. And there is absolutely nothing "loving" about this. Only a depraved God - a "God" who was completely indifferent towards the best interests of his creatures - could gamble with their eternal destinies in such a way. 

For God to actualize such a state of affairs would be entirely inconsistent with the best interests and ultimate well-being of his creatures, since he would have no way of knowing which of his creatures (if any) would exercise their free will in such a way that they would become eternally happy rather than eternally miserable. A truly good and benevolent God would never actualize a state of affairs having a possible outcome that is inconsistent with the best interests and ultimate well-being of his creatures. 

Consider now the following argument against the Open Theism position: 

1. Before creating, the God of Open Theism would've either expected that all would be saved or he wouldn't have had this expectation. 

2. If it
 was his expectation before creation that all would be finally saved, and all are not finally saved, then he would be a fool for expecting this outcome, and would not be worthy of our trust and confidence.[5] 

3. If it
 wasn't his expectation before creation that all would be finally saved, then the God of Open Theism would be malevolent for bringing persons into existence whom he had no expectation of being saved. 

4. The true and living God is neither a fool nor malevolent, but is worthy of our full trust and confidence.


5. The "God" of Open Theism is not the true and living God.
 

Conclusion

So what's the final verdict? In view of the above arguments, I cannot help but conclude that the "God" of Arminian Christianity - no matter how attractively he may be presented by those who profess (and desire) to love and trust him - is just as much a fraud as the "God" of Reformed Christianity. Although he is said to love everyone and to genuinely desire that everyone be saved, the reality is that he is no more loving (and no more sane!) than the depraved, tyrannical being whom the Calvinists believe has predestined a select few for an eternity in heaven while the vast majority of his human creatures are doomed to an eternity in a place of eternal conscious torment. The "God" of Arminian Christianity (who so callously gambles with his creature's eternal destinies and lets chance decide their fate) is neither Christ's God nor Paul's God, and he should not be our God, either.





[1] It should be noted, however, that the free will-affirming theology of Jacob Arminius did not in any way originate with him. Most of the post-apostolic "early church fathers" of the first few centuries - along with most Catholics throughout church history - strongly believed that all human beings have the "free will" to do or believe whatever is necessary for salvation. See, for example, the well-researched appendix in God's Strategy in Human History, by Roger Forster and Paul Marston (the appendix can be read online here: http://www.thedivineconspiracy.org/Z5237P.pdf). 

The most well-known exception to this widely-held belief in human free will within the post-apostolic church was Augustine of Hippo, who (in famous opposition to the free will-affirming theology of the British monk, Pelagius) believed that it was God - rather than man - who decided who would be eternally saved and who wouldn't. If Augustine's position sounds familiar, it's because John Calvin was heavily influenced by the works of Augustine, and the "Reformed" theological position that bears his name is really "Augustinianism," repackaged.


[3] It's telling that one of the most common responses by Christians to the doctrine of universal salvation is that there is no "second chance" after death.

[4] If by "free will" one meant the ability to make choices that are not constrained by circumstances external to oneself, then we could say that God is the only being who has free will. For it is God who is the Author and Creator of all the circumstances in which creatures find themselves. However, even God's freedom to choose is constrained - not by circumstances external to himself, but by his own nature. We are told that "God is love" (1 Jn. 4:8). Assuming this refers to his divine nature or essence, we can conclude that all God does is constrained by a perfectly loving disposition. This would explain why God cannot lie (Titus 1:2), since lying would be inconsistent with God's loving nature. 

[5] As my friend Phillip Garrison noted after reading an earlier draft of this article, the God of Open Theism would, in this case, be like the foolish man of Christ's parable who decided to build a tower but, after having already laid the foundation, realized he did not have enough money to finish what he started (Luke 14:28-30). Such a "God" would be deserving of mockery and pity rather than our devotion and worship.